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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 17-3683 
_______________ 
 
TRANSPORTATION INSURANCE CO; 
 CONTINENTAL CASUALTY CO 
 
 v. 
 
 HEATHLAND HOSPITALITY GROUP LLC;  
 HEATHLAND HOSPITALITY GROUP LP;  
 JUDITH M. SERRATORE, As Administratrix of the  
 Estate of Frank J. Serratore and Ms. Serratore Individually, 
                                                                                          Appellants 
______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-15-cv-04525) 
District Judge: Hon. Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro  
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
May 23, 2019 
______________ 
 
Before: McKEE, SHWARTZ, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion filed: July 26, 2019) 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
Transportation Insurance Company and Continental Casualty Company 
(collectively, “T&C”) brought this declaratory judgment action against their insureds 
Heathland Hospitality Group, LLC, and Heathland Hospitality Group, LP (collectively, 
“Heathland”), and Judith M. Serratore, individually and as Adminstratrix of the Estate of 
Frank J. Serratore. At the summary judgment stage, the District Court concluded that 
T&C does not have a duty to defend and indemnify Heathland in a lawsuit brought by 
Mrs. Serratore against Heathland in Pennsylvania state court. Heathland and Mrs. 
Serratore now appeal that decision. 
We conclude that the Court properly determined that the liquor liability exclusions 
in Heathland’s insurance policies apply, and therefore T&C does not have a duty to 
defend and indemnify Heathland in Mrs. Serratore’s suit. For the following reasons, we 
will affirm the District Court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of T&C. 
I. 
In November 2010, Mrs. Serratore, individually and as Administratrix of the 
Estate of Frank J. Serratore, sued Woodbury Country Club, Heathland, and Michael 
Whittingham in Pennsylvania state court.1 She later filed an amended complaint, 
asserting a common law negligence claim against Heathland. 
                                                 
1 Mrs. Serratore also filed a nearly identical lawsuit in New Jersey state court. However, 
she subsequently withdrew that lawsuit. The only difference between the Pennsylvania 
state court action and the New Jersey state court action is that the New Jersey action was 
brought against additional defendants. On appeal, Heathland’s briefing only cites to, and 
discusses, the claims made in the Pennsylvania state court action. Accordingly, we will 
only refer to the Pennsylvania state court action. 
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 As alleged in the complaint, on November 16, 2008, Mrs. Serratore’s husband was 
fatally injured when the car that he was driving was struck by another car in Gloucester 
Township, New Jersey. The other car was driven by Whittingham, who was allegedly 
intoxicated at the time of the accident. According to the complaint, earlier that day, 
Whittingham became intoxicated at the Woodbury Country Club, “a business 
establishment that sold alcoholic beverages.”2 “At all times relevant,” Defendant 
Heathland “provided management, training, supervision and other services to and for 
Woodbury Country Club including food and beverage sales and services.”3  
In particular, the complaint alleged that the Country Club and/or Heathland (1) 
“sold or gave”4 alcohol to Whittingham, who “became intoxicated,”5 and (2) continued to 
serve him alcohol while he was “visibly intoxicated.”6 Whittingham then left the Country 
Club “visibly intoxicated,” got into his car, and drove away from the Club.7 At some 
point after leaving the Club, Whittingham was involved in the car accident that resulted 
in Mr. Serratore’s death. 
 In her lawsuit, Mrs. Serratore alleged that Heathland was responsible for 
Whittingham’s intoxication and her husband’s resulting death because, among other 
things, Heathland (1) served and/or permitted alcohol to be served to Whittingham “to the 
                                                 
2 App. 240 ¶ 6. See id. at 260 ¶ 33 (incorporating paragraphs 1 through 26 of the initial 
complaint into the amended complaint). 
3 Id. at 241 ¶ 7.  
4 Id. at 241 ¶ 8. 
5 Id. at 241 ¶ 9. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 241 ¶ 10.  
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point where he became visibly intoxicated,”8 and also served and/or permitted alcohol to 
be served to Whittingham “when he was visibly intoxicated;”9 (2) “fail[ed] to train, 
manage, supervise and oversee the sale of alcohol;”10 and (3) failed to institute policies 
and procedures governing the “use and consumption of alcohol.”11 
 Pursuant to the insurance policies that T&C had issued to Heathland,12 Heathland 
sought a defense and indemnification from T&C for the claims asserted in the state court 
actions. By letter, T&C denied insurance coverage based on the policies’ liquor liability 
exclusions. 
 In April 2015, Heathland and Mrs. Serratore entered into a settlement agreement 
entitled “Confidential Assignment and Covenant of Cooperation.”13 Under the 
agreement, Heathland consented to a $6 million judgment and assigned its rights against 
T&C to Mrs. Serratore. Heathland and Mrs. Serratore also entered into a Stipulated 
Judgment. In August 2015, a Pennsylvania court approved and entered the Stipulated 
Judgment against Heathland. 
                                                 
8 Id. at 261 ¶ 35(a). The amended complaint includes two paragraphs which are labeled as 
paragraph 35. We are citing to the paragraph which appears on pages 3 through 5 of the 
complaint and includes subparagraphs (a) through (y).  
9 Id. at 261 ¶ 35(b). 
10 Id. at 263 ¶ 35(w). 
11 Id. at 261–62 ¶ 35(i). 
12 Specifically, Transportation Insurance Company had issued a commercial general 
liability policy to Heathland, while Continental Casualty Company had issued a 
commercial umbrella policy to Heathland. 
13 App. 740–50. 
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Thereafter, T&C filed this suit under the Declaratory Judgment Act,14 seeking a 
declaration that it had no duty to defend and indemnify Heathland because the policies’ 
liquor liability exclusions exempted it from those duties. The District Court granted 
T&C’s motion for summary judgment, and denied Heathland’s cross-motion for 
summary judgment. This appeal followed. 
II.15 
We review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.16 Summary 
judgment is warranted if the moving party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to 
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”17 We view 
all facts “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party” and draw all reasonable 
inferences in that party’s favor.18  
III. 
Under Pennsylvania law, to determine whether an insurer has a duty to defend its 
insured in a suit, we must compare “the four corners of the insurance contract to the four 
corners of the complaint.”19 Notably, “the particular cause of action that a complainant 
                                                 
14 28 U.S.C. § 2201. 
15 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201(a) and 1332. We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201(a) and 1291. 
16 Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 288 (3d Cir. 2018). 
17 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
18 Jutrowski, 904 F.3d at 288 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
19 Am. & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Jerry’s Sport Ctr., Inc., 2 A.3d 526, 541 (Pa. 2010) (citation 
omitted). 
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pleads is not determinative of whether coverage has been triggered. Instead it is necessary 
to look at the factual allegations contained in the complaint.”20 Those factual allegations 
“are to be taken as true and liberally construed in favor of the insured.”21 
Here, the general liability policy issued by Transportation Insurance Company 
contains a “Liquor Liability” exclusion, which provides: 
[t]his insurance does not apply to . . . ‘[b]odily injury’ . . . for which any 
insured may be held liable by reason of: 
 
(1) Causing or contributing to the intoxication of any person; 
 
(2) The furnishing of alcoholic beverages to a person under the legal 
drinking age or under the influence of alcohol; or 
 
(3) Any statute, ordinance or regulation relating to the sale, gift, 
distribution or use of alcoholic beverages. 
This exclusion applies only if you are in the business of manufacturing, 
distributing, selling, serving or furnishing alcoholic beverages.22 
 
Furthermore, the umbrella policy issued by Continental Casualty Company also 
includes a nearly identical “Liquor Liability Limitation,” which states: 
[t]his insurance does not apply to . . . ‘[b]odily injury’ . . . for which any insured 
may be held liable by reason of: 
 
(1) Causing or contributing to the intoxication of any person; 
 
(2) The furnishing of alcoholic beverages to a person under the legal drinking 
age or under the influence of alcohol; or 
 
(3) Any statute, ordinance or regulation relating to the sale, gift, distribution or 
use of alcoholic beverages. 
 
                                                 
20 Mut. Ben. Ins. Co. v. Haver, 725 A.2d 743, 745 (Pa. 1999). 
21 Frog, Switch & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 742, 746 (3d Cir. 1999). 
22 App. 176–77 (emphasis added). 
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Unless, and then only to the extent that coverage is provided by ‘scheduled 
underlying insurance.’23 
 
  On appeal, Heathland renews its argument that the liquor liability exclusions do 
not apply because it was not “in the business of . . . selling, serving, or furnishing 
alcoholic beverages” at the Country Club.24 We disagree. The allegations in the 
complaint are that (1) Woodbury Country Club “was a business establishment that sold 
alcoholic beverages;”25 (2) Heathland managed the Country Club’s “food and beverage 
sales and services,” and trained and supervised the Country Club’s employees as to those 
sales and services;26 and (3) the Country Club and/or Heathland “sold or gave alcoholic 
beverages to Defendant[] Whittingham who consumed the beverages on the premises of” 
the Country Club.27 The complaint unequivocally alleges that Heathland was “in the 
business of . . .  selling, serving or furnishing” alcohol at the Country Club.28 
 We likewise reject Heathland’s contention that the liquor liability exclusions only 
apply to some of Mrs. Serratore’s negligence-related theories of liability.29 As 
                                                 
23 Id. at 199–204. The general liability policy is one of the insurance policies defined in 
the umbrella policy as “scheduled underlying insurance.” Id. at 193. 
24 Id. at 177. 
25 Id. at 240 ¶ 6. 
26 Id. at 241 ¶ 7. 
27 Id. at 241 ¶ 8.   
28 Id. at 177.  
29 Heathland’s reliance on the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision in Penn-America 
Ins. Co. v. Peccadillos, Inc. is misplaced. 27 A.3d 259 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011) (en 
banc), pet. for allowance of appeal denied, 34 A.3d 832 (Pa. 2011). “Pennsylvania’s 
Supreme Court tells us that an insurer’s duty to defend turns on the allegations within 
the four corners of a complaint matched against the terms of the insurance policy.” Lupu 
v. Loan City, LLC, 903 F.3d 382, 395 (3d Cir. 2018) (citing Kvaerner Metals Div. of 
Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 908 A.2d 888, 896 (Pa. 2006)). Here, 
the complaint alleges that Whittingham “consumed” alcohol while on the premises of the 
8 
 
acknowledged by the District Court, while it is true that some of the claims do not 
explicitly refer to the provision of alcohol,30 those claims are not independent from the 
provision of alcohol. Rather, all of Heathland’s allegedly negligent acts and/or omissions 
are closely linked to Heathland and/or the Country Club’s negligent furnishing of alcohol 
to Whittingham – conduct that is plainly covered by the exclusions. 
 The liquor liability exclusions thus apply and bar insurance coverage of all of Mrs. 
Serratore’s claims against Heathland.31 Accordingly, the District Court did not err by 
holding that T&C has no duty to defend and indemnify Heathland.32 Moreover, contrary 
to Heathland’s assertion, the District Court did not improperly decide genuine issues of 
material fact in reaching that holding. The Court’s detailed opinion demonstrates that, in 
                                                                                                                                                             
Country Club, App. 241 ¶ 8, and not only “became intoxicated” but was also “served 
alcohol while visibly intoxicated,” Id. at 241 ¶ 9. It further alleges that the Country Club 
and/or Heathland “sold or gave” the alcohol to Whittingham. Id. Thus, based on the 
allegations in the complaint, Mr. Serratore’s fatal bodily injury is one for which 
Heathland “may be held liable by reason of . . . [c]ausing or contributing to the 
intoxication of” Whittingham, or “by reason of . . . furnishing” alcohol to Whittingham 
when he was “under the influence of alcohol.” Id. at 176–77. Accordingly, under the four 
corners rule, all of Mrs. Serratore’s negligence claims fall squarely within the liquor 
liability exclusions. 
30 For example, Mrs. Serratore alleges that Heathland was negligent for, among other 
things, “allowing the Defendant, Whittingham to exit the Woodbury Country Club after 
he became intoxicated and visibly intoxicated.” Id. at 262 ¶ 35(m). 
31 Given our conclusion that the claims asserted in the state court actions fall within the 
liquor liability exclusions, we need not address whether the general liability policy’s 
“Professional Services” exclusion applies. Id. at 179.  
32 Because the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify, Heathland’s claim 
for indemnification also fails. See Kvaerner, 908 A.2d at 896 n.7. 
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applying Pennsylvania’s four corners rule, it correctly considered the plain meaning of 
the language in the exclusions.33 
IV. 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the District Court’s order granting T&C’s 
motion for summary judgment.  
                                                 
33 See Lupu, 903 F.3d at 393 (recognizing that in Pennsylvania, “[g]enerally, an insurance 
policy’s plain meaning controls” (citation omitted)). 
 
 
